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ABSTRACT
The theory of incomplete contracting is rival to that of complete contracting as a frame of reference
to understand contractual relationships. Both approaches rest upon diametrically opposed postulates
and lead to very different policy conclusions. From a theoretical viewpoint, scrutiny of the postulates
has revealed that both frameworks are reasonable. 
This paper designs and implements an empirical test to discern whether contracts are complete or
incomplete.  We  analyze  a  problem  where  the  parties'  inability  to  commit  not  to  renegotiate
inefficiencies is sufficient for contractual incompleteness. We study optimal contracts with and
without commitment and derive an exclusion restriction that is useful to identify the relevant
commitment scenario. The empirical analysis takes advantage of a data set from Spanish soccer
player contracts. Our test rejects the commitment hypothesis, which entails the acceptance of the
existence of contractual incompleteness in the data. We argue that our conclusions should hold a
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Abstract
The theory of incomplete contracting is rival to that of complete con-
tracting as a frame of reference to understand contractual relation-
ships. Both approaches rest upon diametrically opposed postulates
a n dl e a dt ov e r yd i ﬀerent policy conclusions. From a theoretical view-
point, scrutiny of the postulates has revealed that both frameworks
are reasonable.
This paper designs and implements an empirical test to discern
whether contracts are complete or incomplete. We analyze a problem
where the parties’ inability to commit not to renegotiate ineﬃciencies
is suﬃcient for contractual incompleteness. We study optimal con-
tracts with and without commitment and derive an exclusion restric-
tion that is useful to identify the relevant commitment scenario. The
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1empirical analysis takes advantage of a data set from Spanish soccer
player contracts. Our test rejects the commitment hypothesis, which
entails the acceptance of the existence of contractual incompleteness
in the data. We argue that our conclusions should hold a fortiori in
many other economic environments.
Keywords: incomplete contract, optimal contract, commitment, rene-
gotiation.
JEL classiﬁcation: L14.
1M o t i v a t i o n
The theory of incomplete contracting is rival to that of complete contracting
as a frame of reference to understand contractual relationships. On the one
hand, complete contracts specify all the actions to be taken contingent on
all observable information. On the other hand, incomplete contracts may
omit relevant clauses when these are contingent on information which is non-
veriﬁable by third parties, even if this information is observable by the con-
tracting parties.
T h e r ei sm u c ha ts t a k ei nt h ed e b a t ea b o u tw h i c ha p p r o a c hi sm o r e
appropriate. Theories built around the idea that contracts are incomplete
have shed new light on a wide variety of economic phenomena. Such the-
ories include the limits of the ﬁrm (Grossman and Hart [1986], Hart and
Moore [1990]), the foundations of debt contracts (Aghion and Bolton [1992],
Hart and Moore [1998]), the design of bankruptcy procedures (Aghion et al.
[1992]), the allocation of voting rights in corporations (Grossman and Hart
[1988] and Harris and Raviv [1989]), the limits of the services provided by
the government (Hart et al. [1998], Acemoglu et al. [2003]), the genesis of
democracy (Fleck and Hanssen [2002]), the extension of the franchise (Ace-
moglu and Robinson [2000]), and the genesis of feudal contracts (Comin and
Beunza [2001]).
In this paper, we intend to discern which of the two contracting paradigms
is more appropriate. Approaching the question directly is very complex be-
cause it requires knowing all the clauses in the contract, the information sets
of the contracting parties (as well as those of third parties), the actual be-
havior of the parties along the equilibrium path, and the actions they would
have taken out of the equilibrium path. As in many other empirical prob-
2lems, the researcher never has all this information. To identify the relevant
contracting environment, we propose a strategy that is indirect.
Amongst the existing contributions to the foundations of incomplete con-
tracts, the approach of Segal [1995, 1999] and Hart and Moore [1998, 1999]
is prominent. This approach relies heavily on the assumption that parties
t oac o n t r a c ta r eu n a b l et oc o m m i tn o tt or e n e g o t i a t et h e i rc o n t r a c t .A tt h e
core of the Segal-Hart-Moore argument is the fact that lack of commitment
may place severe limitations on the set of implementable outcomes, thereby
leading to the signing of contracts which are not “suﬃciently” contingent on
variables that are relevant.1
Our environment, which diﬀers from that of Segal-Hart-Moore in many
respects, is one in which the contracting parties’ inability to commit not to
renegotiate their contracts ex-post restricts the set of implementable out-
comes and provides–as in the aforementioned authors’ contributions–a ra-
tionale for contractual incompleteness. This implies that we can establish the
incompleteness of contracts by ascertaining the parties’ lack of commitment
not to renegotiate.
Contract theorists are divided about the issue of commitment. The ques-
tion is why parties do not ﬁnd ways to prevent ex-post beneﬁcial but ex-
ante detrimental renegotiation. For insightful discussions, see Tirole [1999],
Maskin and Tirole [1999], and Hart and Moore [1999]. Reasonable arguments
can be made in favor and against the commitment hypothesis. As Hart and
Moore [1999, p. 132] put it,
“the degree of commitment [not to renegotiate] is something about
which reasonable people can disagree.”2
Once the theoretical approach has reached a dead end, any attempt to
determine the ability of parties to commit not to renegotiate must resort to
empirical observation. This is what we try to do in this paper by focusing on
one speciﬁc transaction–namely, the transfer of a soccer player from club A
to club B.
1It should be noted that other explanations of incomplete contracts exist that are based
on bounded rationality–and not on the commitment assumption. See Anderlini and Felli
[1994], Battigalli and Maggi [2002], and references therein.
2The commitment issue also resides at the center of many other economic problems,
such as time inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott [1977], Barro and Gordon [1983]), or
entry deterrence (Dixit [1979]).
3Unfortunately, testing for commitment directly requires the same large
amount of information as testing for contractual incompleteness. Neverthe-
less, moving one step backwards and analyzing the optimal contract between
the player and club A with and without commitment allows us to derive an
exclusion restriction that we can bring to the data to identify the contracting
environment.
In a world where parties can commit, the player and A can design a
contract that allows them to achieve two goals: maximize extraction of the
entrant’s rent and divide the surplus extracted to optimize risk-sharing. This
implies that the player and A can credibly commit not to transfer the player
to B unless B pays the sum that maximizes their expected joint surplus. In
Section 2, we show that if there is commitment and the player and A sign
any optimal contract, this sum is only a function of club A’s valuation of
the player and the parties’ beliefs about club B’s valuation of the player.
When parties lack this ability to commit, however, the optimal contract
does not in general separate the problems of rent extraction and surplus
division. We provide one possible explanation for this assertion, but we,
on no way, claim it to be the only rationale for the non-separability of rent
extraction and surplus division.
In our context, the player is risk-averse. One goal of the optimal contract
is to insure the player against the risk of a failed transaction. However, when
bargaining with club B, the player does not internalize the loss incurred
by club A when a transaction fails. If the player is fully insured, he will
tend to behave too aggressively at the renegotiation stage. To avoid this,
the optimal contract trades oﬀ insuring the player with aligning the parties’
incentives at the renegotiation stage. This trade-oﬀ arises only when parties
cannot commit not to renegotiate and implies that variables related to the
division of surplus may aﬀect the rent extracted from club B when the player
is transferred.
More speciﬁcally, we show that, under no commitment, it is no longer
the case that the value of the player for club A and the distribution of B’s
valuations of the player are suﬃcient statistics for the total ﬁnancial outlay
incurred by club B to hire the player. In particular, the compensation that
the player must pay A to unilaterally break the relationship–known as the
transfer fee–may aﬀect the total payment made by B above and beyond the
clubs’ valuations of the player.
The critical observation for our exclusion restriction follows: under com-
mitment, the transfer price is only a function of club A’s valuation of the
4player and the parties’ beliefs about the club B’s valuation. Under no com-
mitment, however, the transfer fee may have predictive power over the trans-
fer price even after controlling for the clubs’ valuations of the player.3 Fur-
thermore, since the optimal contract under no commitment is incomplete, the
excess sensitivity of the transfer payments to the transfer fee would imply
that the contracts signed by clubs and soccer players are incomplete.
To implement this test, we construct a data set containing information
about all the transfers of soccer players in the Spanish league (“La Liga”)
during the three seasons between 1998 and 2001. This data set contains de-
mographic information for each player, as well as two measures of the play-
ers’ value constructed by two specialized magazines and information about
salaries received by players from the buying clubs and compensations to the
selling clubs.
Our point estimate of the elasticity of the total compensation received
by club A and the player in a transaction with respect to the transfer fee is
approximately 0.5. This result, however, could be due to the mismeasurement
o ft h ev a l u eo ft h ep l a y e ri ft h i si sc o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h et r a n s f e rf e e . T o
explore this possibility, we use the model developed in Section 2 to study the
determinants of the transfer fee. This allows us to obtain three instruments
for the transfer fee for each player: the probability of transferring a player
by position, by club, and the average transfer fee for the club excluding the
player. We then show that the excess sensitivity of the total transfer price
to the transfer fee persists after instrumenting for the transfer fee. Using
an overidentifying restriction test, we also show that the instruments used
are valid (i.e. both relevant and exogenous). Based on these results, we
conclude that parties cannot commit not to renegotiate and therefore that
soccer contracts are incomplete.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that tests for the
existence of commitment and contractual incompleteness. We know of three
related strands of the literature.
The ﬁrst subset of papers try to test some implications of the property-
rights approach of Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart [1995]–an application
of the theory of incomplete contracts. Baker and Hubbard [2003] ﬁnd that
ownership patterns in trucking reﬂect the importance of both incomplete
contracts (Grossman and Hart [1986]) and job design and measurement is-
3T h em e r ep r e s e n c eo fat r a n s f e rf e ed o e sn o ti m p l yt h a tp a r t i e sa r eu n a b l et oc o m m i t
because some clauses of the optimal complete contract can be written as a transfer fee.
5sues (Holmstrom and Milgrom [1994]). Acemoglu et al. [2004] show that the
relationship between a downstream (producer) industry and an upstream
(supplier) industry is more likely to be vertically integrated when the pro-
ducing industry is more technology intensive and the supplying industry is
less technology intensive.
Rather than testing the implications of the theory of incomplete con-
tracts, our approach is more primitive in that it focuses on a postulate–the
no commitment hypothesis–which constitutes a source (rather than an im-
plication) of contractual incompleteness.
Another subset of papers studies the importance of reputation on contrac-
tual choices and on outcomes. Crocker and Reynolds [1993] study the choice
of procurement contracts for airplane engines in the US military. They ﬁnd
that higher values of some measures of reputation and complexity lead to the
drafting of a more incomplete contract. McMillan and Woodruﬀ [1999] use
several measures of trusts to show that inter-ﬁrm trade credit is more likely
when the delivering ﬁrm trusts its client. Finally, Banerjee and Duﬂo [2000]
test the importance of several measures of reputation (like the age of the ﬁrm
or whether the client-ﬁrm relationship is repeated) on the contract chosen
by a software developing ﬁrm and its client and on the ex-post cost overruns
and their distribution. Their results seem to indicate that reputation allows
ﬁrms to move from ﬁxed-cost contracts to time and material contracts and
to reduce the share of the overrun paid.
These three papers are very interesting but the fact that reputation and
repetition matter for the choice of a contract is not very informative about
the extent to which they suﬃce to solve the commitment problem. Two sce-
narios are possible. The ﬁrst is one where reputation and folk-theorem type
of considerations are so important that agents behave as if their relation-
ship were governed by a comprehensive contract. The second is one where
contractual incompleteness is generalized and agents value the consolidation
of a trustable relationship enormously. We hope to overcome this identiﬁ-
cation problem by a more direct approach to testing for commitment and
contractual incompleteness.
Finally, our test for contractual incompleteness is similar in spirit to those
conducted elsewhere to test the completeness of ﬁnancial markets (Cochrane
[1991], Mace [1991] and Townsend [1994]).
The paper contains three additional sections. Section 2 lays out the model
and the concepts and notation used in the rest of the paper. Section 3 con-
tains the theoretical results needed to design our test. Section 4 implements
6the test. Section 5 concludes by arguing that, because actions taken by
players and clubs become widely observable to the general public and rep-
utational considerations play an important role in the world of soccer, the
contractual incompleteness observed in soccer contracts is likely to hold a
fortiori in many other economic environments.
2M o d e l i n g s o c c e r c o n t r a c t s
We envisage a two-period model. At date 0, a club, A, and a player sign a
c o n t r a c t .A td a t e1 ,a f t e rt h ec o n t r a c ti si np l a c e ,t h ep l a y e ra n dA interact
with a potential recruiter, B,a l s or e f e r r e dt oa st h eo u t s i d e r .
An ex-post unveriﬁable state of nature described by a vector v =
(vA,v B) ∈ V = VA × VB is realized at the beginning of date 1. Here, vi
represents i’s valuation of the player, VA and VB are ﬁnite subsets of [0,vA]
and [vB,vB], respectively, and 0 < vA <v B < vB < +∞. These inequalities
i m p l yt h a ti ti sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g et h a tB’s valuation of the player exceeds
that of A, so that allocative eﬃciency requires that the player be matched
with B.4 It is assumed that vA and vB are independent random variables,
and that each vi occurs with probability αi(vi).5 Without loss of generality,
we may assume that αB(vB) > 0.
We make the following assumptions on the distribution of information at
the beginning of date 1, after the realization of the state of nature. First,
A’s valuation of the player is commonly observed by all agents. Second, B’s
valuation is B’s private information.
The ﬁrst assumption reﬂects the idea that the player’s performance on A
becomes observable by other employers; in the terminology of Milgrom and
Oster [1987], the player is “visible.”6
At the end of date 1, an outcome is realized. An outcome is an allocation
of the player to a club along with a number of monetary transfers. We
4Assuming possible but uncertain gains from trade with the outsider would require a
notion of eﬃciency along the lines of Holmstrom and Myerson’s “durability” (Holmstrom
and Myerson [1983]) and would complicate matters signiﬁcantly. We see no reason why
the assumption of uncertain gains from trade would undermine the results of the paper.
5Independence can be dispensed with.
6While most workers’ abilities can be concealed by an employer from potential employ-
ers, some particular types, such as movie actors, artists, and professional sports players,
are closer to the “visible” characterization.




,w h e r e
di =1if club i signs the player, di =0otherwise, and xi ∈ R represents
the monetary transfer received by agent i. An outcome is feasible if its
corresponding distribution of transfers, (xi)i∈{P,A,B},h a sxP + xA + xB =0 .
The set of all feasible outcomes is denoted Y .




realized in state v =( vA,v B)
gives a utility of
ui(y,v)=divi + xi to agent i ∈ {A,B}
and a utility of
uP(y,v)=u(xP) to the player;
here, u is continuous, strictly increasing, and concave.
The present setting ignores two issues. First, it does not take into account
that the player could care not only about money but also about the identity
of the club he ends up playing on. In this case, the player could have private
information about his preferences over clubs. This would introduce an infor-
mational asymmetry between club A and the player which does not appear
in our model. Second, our setting ignores that the player has control over
his performance and can therefore inﬂuence the clubs’ valuations, thereby
improving his bargaining power not only prior to the signing of the contract
but also in any ex-post renegotiation of it. We conjecture that extending our
model to incorporate these considerations would not alter the essence of our
results. We have chosen to use a simpler enviroment to ease exposition.
2.1 Feasible contracts
A contract signed by the player and A at date 0 is deﬁn e da sam a pf r o m
the set of states V to the set of outcomes Y .
The feasibility of a contract depends on whether the parties are able
to commit not to renegotiate contractual ineﬃciencies, according to a well-
deﬁn e dn o t i o no fi n e ﬃciency (to be introduced shortly). In the next subsec-
tions, a precise deﬁnition of contract feasibility, with and without commit-
ment, is furnished.
A contract is feasible if it can be implemented through a mechanism. To
make this terminology precise, some preliminaries are needed.










is a collection of strategy sets and ρ : S → Y ,w h e r e
S = SP × SA × SB. A mechanism induces a Bayesian game to be played
by the player, A,a n dB, at the beginning of date 1, after the realization of
the state. The nature of this game is determined by the parties’ ability to
commit not to renegotiate. We consider the two cases–where there is and
where there is not commitment–in turn.
2.1.1 Commitment
Under commitment, every agent i must simultaneously choose an action from
Si.T h em a pρ turns the agents’ choices into a feasible outcome. The parties
are committed to abide the outcome dictated by ρ. This outcome cannot be
renegotiated even if it is ineﬃcient in the allocative sense (i.e., if it assigns
the player to A). Since the state of nature is payoﬀ-relevant and all agents
receive (at least partial) information about its realization, the agents’ strate-
gies in this game may be contingent on this information. The player and
A,w h oo b s e r v evA, may therefore choose actions contingent on vA,w h i l eB,
who observes both vA and vB, may choose actions that depend on (vA,v B).
The player and A’s beliefs about vB are derived consistently from the prior
distribution of the state. Given the assumed independence between vA and
vB, these beliefs do not vary with vA even though vA is observable. They
may thus be described by the probability measure αB over VB.A s t r a t e g y
proﬁle s = s(·) (specifying, for each player, an action from his action space
given the player’s information about the state of nature) gives player i an







where α denotes the joint distribution of (vA,v B). The game associated to
the mechanism g is denoted as Γ(g).





may be obtained such that some equilibrium s of the
game Γ(g) induces the outcome dictated by contract f in every state of the
world and, at this outcome, each agent obtains at least an expected payoﬀ
of 0. These conditions are formally expressed as follows.












α(v) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ {P,A}.
If these conditions are fulﬁlled, we say that g implements f.
2.1.2 No commitment
The notion of feasibility with no commitment is a bit more complicated. With
no commitment, ineﬃcient outcomes are not ﬁnal, but rather renegotiated
away. Given that we are assuming that it is common knowledge that B’s
valuation exceeds that of A,h e r ea nineﬃcient outcome is one that does
not allocate the player to club B.
Beyond the speciﬁcs of the renegotiation process, introduced in Subsec-
tion 3.1.2, the possibility of renegotiation introduces two new considerations.
First, if contract design aﬀects renegotiation, a contract is implemented
not only by the choice of a mechanism, but also by the speciﬁcation of a set
of contractible variables that may aﬀect the equilibrium play at the renego-
tiation stage.7
Second, the player and A might acquire information other than that trans-
mitted by their own signals while under the inﬂuence of a contract. Of course,
the distribution of information that prevails when a mechanism concludes
(and before the renegotiation stage is initiated) may aﬀect the equilibrium
renegotiated outcome.
To provide a notion of contract feasibility with no commitment that ac-
commodates these two points, some preliminaries are needed.




, a set of contractible variables F







of renegotiation mechanisms, referred to as a renegotiation process,c o n -
sider the following extensive game Γ(g,F). First, the state of nature v is cho-
sen according to the joint distribution α.C l u b B observes nature’s choice,
7This idea was formalized by Aghion et al. [1994].
10while the player and A observe A’s valuation only. Then each agent i chooses
an action si from Si. The agents’ choices are simultaneous and determine
the outcome ρ(s),w h e r es =( si)i∈{P,A,B}.T h eo u t c o m eρ(s) is followed by
renegotiation.8 In the renegotiation, each agent i chooses an action ai from
Si(F,ρ(s)). The action proﬁle a =( ai)i∈{P,A,B} induces the renegotiated
outcome ρF,ρ(s)(a).H e r eastrategy for player i is a function ˜ si that speci-
ﬁes an action contingent on the player’s information and on i’s past moves.
More precisely, for i ∈ {P,A}, ˜ si(vA) represents the action from Si i would
choose in the ﬁrst stage–the implementation stage–were i to observe vA,
while ˜ si(vA,s i,y) designates the action from Si(F,y) chosen by the type vA
of i in the game’s second stage–the renegotiation stage–following her own
past choice si ∈ Si and the observation of outcome y.F o r B, ˜ sB(v) and
˜ sB(v,sB,y) are deﬁned similarly.





where µ(vA,sP,y) and µ(vA,sA,y) are probability measures over VB, (vA,s i,y) ∈
VA × Si × Y for each i ∈ {P,A},a n dµ(vA,si,y) describes i’s beliefs about
B’s valuation after the observation of nature’s choice of A’s valuation vA, i’s
action si at the stage of contract implementation, and the result y dictated
by the contract.9
Let ˜ s be a strategy proﬁle. The expected utility that player i ∈ {P,A}




























8For notational convenience, we say that any outcome is followed by renegotiation, yet
the renegotiation process is assumed to be irrelevant if ρ(s) is not ineﬃcient.
9Observe that we are modelling the game in such a way that agents do not observe
the other players’ (past and current) moves. Only private signals, own moves, and the
outcomes dictated by the contract are observed by each individual. The adoption of this
assumption is not consequential. It merely responds to the necessity of being explicit as to
the information available to each player at each information set in the formal speciﬁcation
of the game. Assuming that other players’ (past and current) moves are observed would
not alter the essence of our results.
11The expected utility that player i ∈ {P,A} would derive from ˜ s in the second
stage after choosing the action si in the ﬁrst stage, were she to observe the
signal vA and the result y, and if her beliefs regarding B’s valuation were
































Note that this expression diﬀers from the one above in that club B has no
uncertainty about the state of the world.
Ap r o ﬁle of strategies and system of beliefs (˜ s,µ) is an equilibrium in
Γ(g,F) if (i) the agents’ strategies are optimal both at the implementa-
tion and renegotiation stages given their information, their beliefs, and the
strategies of the other players, and (ii) beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule.
Formally, these conditions are expressed as follows.
• ˜ ui(˜ s|vA) ≥ ˜ ui(ˆ si, ˜ s−i|vA) for each ˆ si,e v e r yvA,a n da l li ∈ {P,A}.








ˆ si, ˜ s−i
¯ ¯ ¯vA,s i,y,µ (vA,si,y)
´
for each ˆ si,e v e r y








ˆ sB, ˜ s−B
¯ ¯ ¯v,sB,y
´
for each ˆ sB and every (v,sB,y).
• The system of beliefs µ is derived from strategy proﬁle ˜ s through Bayes’
rule whenever possible.















a set of contractible variables F may be obtained such that, for some equi-
librium (˜ s,µ) in the game Γ(g,F), the outcome of the renegotiation process
12associated with this equilibrium in every state of nature is the outcome dic-
tated by the contract and yields at least an expected payoﬀ of 0 to each
agent. Letting







these conditions are formally expressed as follows.
• f(v)=yv for every v ∈ V .
• uB(yv,v) ≥ 0 for every v ∈ V .
•
P
v∈V ui(yv,v)α(v) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ {P,A}.
If these conditions are fulﬁlled, we say that f is implementable by g and
F without commitment.
2.2 Optimal contracts
Whether there is or there is not commitment, we postulate that the parties
sign optimal contracts. A contract f is optimal with commitment (respec-
tively, optimal with no commitment)i fi ti sf e a s i b l ew i t hc o m m i t m e n t
(respectively, with no commitment) and no other contract ˜ f is feasible with
commitment (respectively, with no commitment), and, at the same time, im-
proves the date-0 expected payoﬀ of at least one of the parties and does not
worsen the date-0 expected payoﬀ of either party, that is,
X
v∈V
ui( ˜ f(v),v)α(v) ≥
X
v∈V
ui(f(v),v)α(v) for each i ∈ {P,A},( 1 )
with strict inequality for some i ∈ {P,A}.
2.3 Incomplete contracts
While there is no well-accepted deﬁnition of contractual incompleteness, the
common perception is that a contract is incomplete if it is not as “fully”
contingent on the state of nature as the parties to the contract would like
it to be. This idea is rather vague, and hence may accommodate diﬀerent
formalizations.
13Following Tirole [1999], we view an incomplete contract as a contract
that is restricted. Implementation theory, along with the commitment as-
sumption, provides, through a number of incentive constraints, a well-deﬁned
description of the set of feasible outcomes. It is with respect to this set that an
incomplete contract is constrained. That is, the parties to an incomplete con-
tract cannot achieve a “best” outcome, relative to what is achievable under
the standard approach to contract theory. While in other papers incomplete
contracting relates to a focus on a subset of feasible outcomes through the
imposition of ad hoc restrictions on the set of allowable contracts, we follow
Segal [1995, 1999] and Hart and Moore [1988, 1999] and provide a model in
which these constraints are derived endogenously from the no commitment
assumption.
The formal deﬁnition of contractual incompleteness adopted here is stated
as follows. A contract f that is feasible with no commitment is incomplete
if the player and A w o u l dl i k et ob ea b l et oc o m m i tn o tt or e n e g o t i a t e ,f o r
then they could sign a feasible (with commitment) contract ˜ f which would
improve (relative to f) the date-0 expected payoﬀs of the parties, that is, (1)
would hold with strict inequality for some i.
Observe that, in general, an incomplete contract is not ﬂexible enough
to make outcomes contingent on the state of nature in an optimal fashion.
Also, this notion of incompleteness implies that an incomplete contract is
one where parties would like (but are not able) to enforce relevant clauses
contingent on information that is observable but not veriﬁable. We shall see
that in our setting the player and A would like to enforce a clause whereby
they experience large punishments in case the renegotiation stage is reached.
3 Theoretical results
Our test of the commitment hypothesis is based on an exclusion restriction
derived in Subsection 3.1. Subsection 3.2 establishes a connection between
lack of commitment and contractual incompleteness. In light of our theoret-
ical results, refutation of the commitment hypothesis entails the acceptance
of the existence of contractual incompleteness in the data.
143.1 Determinants of the outsider’s ﬁnancial outlay from
signing the player
In this section, we derive two results. First, we characterize the determi-
nants of B’s ﬁnancial outlay from signing the player after the signing of any
optimal contract and under the commitment assumption (Subsection 3.1.1).
Second, we assume lack of commitment and some renegotiation process and
characterize, in the context of an example, the determinants of B’s ﬁnancial
outlay from signing the player after the signing of some optimal contract
(Subsection 3.1.2).
3.1.1 Commitment
In this section, we postulate that the parties are able to commit themselves
to refrain from renegotiating their contract if, at some point, it is to their
mutual advantage to do so. In principle, there are ways in which parties who
are determined to prevent renegotiation might succeed in doing so. This
issue is discussed extensively in Maskin and Tirole [1999], Tirole [1999], and
Hart and Moore [1999].
We show that, under commitment, the player and A can design a contract
that allows them to achieve two goals: maximize extraction of the entrant’s
rent and divide the surplus extracted to optimize risk-sharing. The sepa-
ration of the rent extraction and insurance problems implies that all the
contracts that are optimal with commitment share a common characteristic
that plays a central role in the identiﬁcation of the relevant commitment en-
vironment. We start by illustrating this property in the context of a speciﬁc
contract that is optimal under commitment and then show the result in the
general case.
The following description of a contract is informal; its formal analogue, in
terms of the notation introduced in Section 2, is omitted to ease exposition.
Consider a contract f∗ that speciﬁes a transfer fee F that A is entitled to
receive from the player if another club signs the player without A’s approval.
At date 1, the player may unilaterally negotiate with B a n ds i g nf o rB after
paying A the transfer fee. Alternatively, the player may form a coalition
with A to bargain a potential transaction with B. In the latter case, A and
t h ep l a y e rm a k eaj o i n tp r o p o s a lt oB. This proposal is chosen according
to the following agreement. Club A and the player announce their private
information–i.e., the observed realization of A’s valuation. If both agents
15announce ˆ vA, B must pay, in order to sign the player, a certain amount
B(ˆ vA).I fB accepts, the amount w is for the player, while B(ˆ vA)−w accrues
to A.I fB declines, the player may not sign for B unless he pays A the fee
F. If the player stays on A,h ei sp a i dt h ew a g ew. Finally, if the agents’
announcements do not coincide, f∗ dictates that the player must remain on
A and receive wage w.
Our ﬁrst result states that, if the parties are able to commit themselves
not to renegotiate their contract, a choice for F, w,a n de a c hB(ˆ vA) exists
such that f∗ is optimal. The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Under commitment, F, w,a n de a c hB(ˆ vA) m a yb ec h o s e n
in a way that f∗ is optimal.
At the optimal contract, commitment induces B to take A and the player’s
joint proposal seriously because otherwise the contract bans any transaction
below the transfer fee. On the other hand, a carefully designed system of
punishments, along with commitment, induces the player and A to announce
vA truthfully. Each B(vA) may therefore be chosen to maximize extraction
of B’s rent, and the surplus extracted may be divided between the parties to
optimize risk-sharing.
Contract f∗ i sv e r s a t i l ee n o u g ht op e r m i tas e p a r a t et r e a t m e n to fr e n t
extraction and surplus division. Under commitment, a contract may be de-
signed that performs well on both fronts. In particular, B’s total ﬁnancial
disbursement from hiring the player under the precepts of f∗ maximizes the










where vA represents the realization of A’s valuation of the player. This obser-
vation has implications on the determinants of club B’s ﬁnancial outlay from
signing the player: when the parties can commit not to renegotiate contract
f∗, the value of the player for A, vA, and the conditional distribution of the
value of the player for B are suﬃcient statistics for the total disbursement
incurred by B when there is a transaction. In other words, after conditioning
on vA and the conditional distribution of vB, no other variable should have
predictive power on B’s total cost of hiring the player.
It turns out that this property is not speciﬁc of contract f∗. Indeed, it is
shared by any optimal contract the player A may sign under commitment.
16This is stated formally in the following proposition, the proof of which is
provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Suppose that there is commitment. Then, for any optimal











This result is one of the two basic pillars for the identiﬁcation restriction
that allows us to test the commitment hypothesis and, ultimately, whether or
not contracts are incomplete. The second main theoretical result is derived
in the next section.
3.1.2 No commitment
In this section, we study optimal contracts with no commitment. Here, we
do not attempt to be general. Rather, our aim is to illustrate that, under
lack of commitment and certain renegotiation processes, the determinants of
B’s total ﬁnancial expenses from signing the player may diﬀer from those of
the previous section.
The analysis of the present section diﬀers from that of the previous one in
that now agents rely on renegotiation whenever the signed contract results in
an ineﬃcient outcome, and, as is standard, this outcome serves as the default
outcome (i.e., the “threat” point) should renegotiation break down.
Since we want to emphasize a particular connection between contract
design and renegotiation, we allow the parties to contract on an upper bound
(a non-negative real) on any monetary transfer A may receive if the player
changes club. This upper bound is referred to as transfer fee.I ti se ﬀective
for the duration of any subsequent renegotiation process involving the player,
A,a n dB. Other aspects of this process, such as the distribution of bargaining
power, the order of moves, the number of moves, and the parties’ ability to
impose certain default outcomes are beyond the control of the contracting
parties.10 T h u s ,w ef o c u so nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hF consists only of one variable,
the said transfer fee.
10Unlike Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey [1994], we do not assume that the parties can
impose trade as a default option, for here trade involves a third party who does not sign
the initial contract.
17The renegotiation process. We restrict attention to the following sim-
ple renegotiation process. Suppose that a contract results in the implemen-
tation of outcome y in state v,a n dl e tF be the transfer fee inherited from
this contract. The renegotiation process that follows can be divided into
two sub-processes. In the ﬁrst sub-process, the player and B bargain over
the total sum B would expend were the player to change club. We assume
that in this negotiation the player has all the bargaining power and makes
a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to B.H e r e a n o ﬀer consists of a quantity x that
represents B’s total ﬁnancial outlay from hiring the player. Club B may
accept or decline. A rejection closes renegotiation and forces the prevalence
of the default outcome y. The second sub-process starts if B accepts the
player’s proposal. In this sub-process, the player and A bargain over the
division of B’s disbursement x. Either party may force this renegotiation
sub-process to result in disagreement. In this case, the default outcome pre-
vails. If, on the other hand, an agreement is reached, the sub-process outputs
ap a y m e n tzi(x,F,vA,y,β) ∈ R received by agent i,w h e r ei ∈ {P,A} and














Each zi m a yd e p e n do nt h ee x p e n s en e g o t i a t e dw i t hB, x, the transfer fee,
F, A’s valuation of the player, vA, the default outcome, y, some measure β
of the player’s bargaining power, and perhaps other variables, such as the
distribution of vB (omitted in the above formulation to ease notation).11
Observe that we do not model the second stage of the renegotiation process
explicitly. Rather, we postulate that the negotiation between the player and
A results in a division of the surplus that depends on the variables listed
above. Moreover, we shall later impose one condition on each zi.W h i l ew e
do not rationalize zP and zA, along with the condition these objects shall be
assumed to satisfy, by the equilibrium play of some game form, it is possible
to derive them endogenously.
11O b s e r v et h a t ,s i n c et h ep l a y e ra n dA have incomplete information about B’s valuation,
the renegotiation process may yield an ineﬃcient outcome. This may be remedied by
modelling the bargaining between the agents as a three-player inﬁnite-horizon extensive
game with incomplete information. We conjecture that our results continue to hold if our
simple negotiation is replaced by some such extensive game.
18The following example illustrates that the transfer fee may play an im-
portant role in determining the total expense incurred by B even after condi-
tioning on vA and the distribution of vB. We also use the example to discuss
the determinants of the optimal transfer fee. This discussion will be relevant
for the instrumentation of the transfer fee in the empirical section.
Example 1. Suppose that the player’s utility function is
u(x)=
½
xϑ if x ≥ 0,
−∞ if x<0,
where ϑ ∈ (0,1).L e tVA = {a} and VB = {b,c,d},w h e r e0 <a<b<c<d .
Suppose that, in the negotiation between A and the player, A obtains a share
β ∈ (0,1) of the transfer fee agreed upon at date 0.
If the renegotiation stage is reached, the player decides on the amount
he demands from B. At this stage, the default outcome (which speciﬁes an
allocation of the player to some club and a distribution of transfers) and the
transfer fee are already determined.
Given the assumed renegotiation process, B always accepts demands
l o w e rt h a no re q u a lt ob.C l u b B accepts demands in the interval (b,c]
when B’s valuation of the player is greater than or equal to c.T h i so c c u r s
with probability p2 = αB(c)+αB(d). Demands in the interval (c,d] are ac-
cepted by B only when B’s valuation of the player is d.T h i sh a p p e n sw i t h
probability p3 = αB(d).
Given B’s strategy, the player only considers three possible demands: b,
c,a n dd. All other demands are strictly dominated. Demands higher than
d are never accepted by B. Any demand in the set (0,b) ∪ (b,c) ∪ (c,d) are
d o m i n a t e db ya ne l e m e n to f{b,c,d}. This means that for every element ˜ x of
(0,b) ∪ (b,c) ∪ (c,d) there exists x in {b,c,d} such that the probability that
B accepts ˜ x is not higher than the probability that he accepts x and x>˜ x.
Therefore, by demanding ˜ x the player would leave money on the table.
Given club B’s strategy, the player’s utility function, the assumed renego-
tiation process, a transfer fee F, and a default outcome whose distribution of
payments assigns xP to the player, the player’s expected utilities associated















+( 1− p3)u(xP) if the player demands d.
19The player’s optimal demands are as follows:
b if xP <y 1,
c if y1 ≤ xP ≤ y2,
























Observe that the cut-oﬀs y1(F) and y2(F) decrease with F. The transfer
fee aﬀects the player’s incentives in the renegotiation stage because, for a
given demand, it reduces the player’s payoﬀ in the event of a transaction.
In other words, it reduces the player’s loss if B rejects the player’s demand.
This smaller loss induces the player to demand more aggressively.
In what follows we make the following parametric assumption:
p2c +( 1− p2)a>max
n
b,p3d +( 1− p3)a
o
.
This assumption implies that the demand that maximizes the expected rents
for the player-A coalition is c.
In general, the optimal contract maximizes the sum of expected utili-
ties for the player and A subject to the player’s incentive and participation
constraints. It is illustrative to temporarily assume that neither of these con-
straints is binding at the optimum. In this instance, the optimal contract























Observe that this solution completely insures the player, whose payoﬀ is
independent of B’s response to the player’s demand. Note also that the fact
20that the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding means that A can
induce the player to ask for the expected-rent-maximizing demand (i.e., c).
In this case, there is no trade-oﬀ between surplus division and rent extraction.



















In this case, the player and A have two options.12 They can perfectly insure
the player by setting his payment in the event of no transaction equal to
x∗
P a n dt h e nl e tt h ep l a y e rc h o o s ed. This option gives the following sum of















Alternatively, A can set xP so that the player demands c from B at the ex-
pense of forcing him to bear some risk. Under this alternative, the aggregate



















p2−p3 are positive; otherwise, the deﬁnition of u
entails that the sum of expected payoﬀsi s−∞, in which case this alternative
is dominated by the previous one). The ﬁrst-order condition associated with
the optimal transfer fee in this second case is as follows:
p2
Marginal value of F in the unconstrained problem z }| {
β
³






















12Inducing the player to choose b is dominated by the second option because we are
assuming that b maximizes the expected rent extracted from B.
21This ﬁrst-order condition recognizes that, when the player’s incentive
constraint is binding, the transfer fee aﬀe c t st h ep l a y e r ’ sd e m a n dt oB in
addition to determining A’s payoﬀ after a transaction. The optimal transfer
fee is determined by reaching a compromise between these two margins.
If the player’s incentive constraint is binding (i.e., x∗
P >y 2(F∗)), the
marginal value of the player’s payoﬀ when there is no transaction (xP)i s
positive. We have already seen that y2 decreases with F (i.e., ∂y2/∂F<
0). These two observations imply that the second term in (2) is negative
and therefore that the ﬁr s tt e r mm u s tb ep o s i t i v e . T h i sm e a n st h a tt h e
optimal transfer fee of the constrained problem is smaller than that of the
unconstrained problem (F∗).
Intuitively, at the renegotiation stage, the player does not internalize A’s
loss when B rejects the player’s demand. As a result, the player tends to be
too aggressive. Club A must oﬀer the player a risky contract to induce him
to demand c. Such a contract reduces the player’s payoﬀ when there is no
transaction and increases his payoﬀ when he changes club. This diﬀerential
in the player’s utility when he is transferred makes him more cautious at the
renegotiation stage.
In general, whether it is optimal to insure the player and let him demand
d at the renegotiation stage or to make him bear risk so that he demands
c depends on the player’s relative risk aversion (1 − ϑ) and on how binding
the incentive constraint is. This, in turn, depends, among other things, on
the player’s risk aversion. For low values of ϑ, x∗
P is small (and y2(F∗) is
large), and therefore the incentive constraint may be non-binding or binding
by a small margin. For high values of ϑ, x∗
P is large (and y2(F∗) is small),
and therefore the incentive constraint is likely to be binding by a large mar-
gin. Thus, in general, the value of the player for A and the distribution of
the value of the player for B are no longer suﬃcient statistics of B’s total
ﬁnancial outlay from signing the player when the parties cannot commit not
to renegotiate. With commitment, B’s total expense from signing the player
was, as demonstrated by Proposition 2, independent of the player’s degree
of risk aversion. This example illustrates that, by contrast, lack of commit-
ment may lead to a situation in which the player’s degree of risk aversion
has an eﬀect on B’s total expense from signing the player. This is the most
important lesson from this example.
This observation leaves open the possibility that other variables corre-
lated with the player’s risk aversion have an econometric impact on B’s total
expense in a transaction if risk aversion is not properly controlled for. One
22such variable may be the transfer fee. To see this more clearly, we make
the following sensible conjecture. When the incentive constraint is binding
by a small margin, the optimal contract induces the player to demand c at
the renegotiation stage. When the incentive constraint is binding by a large
margin, the optimal contract provides complete insurance for the player and
the player demands d. We have already seen that for low values of ϑ (i.e.,
when risk aversion is high), x∗
P is small (and y2(F∗) is large), and therefore
the incentive constraint is binding by a small margin. For high values of ϑ,
x∗
P is large (and y2(F∗) is small), and therefore the incentive constraint is
likely to be binding by a large margin.
Consider two players whose corresponding vA a n dd i s t r i b u t i o no fvB are
identical. Suppose the two players diﬀer in their degree of risk aversion (1−ϑ).
Suppose that the incentive constraint is binding for both players, but that
the constraint is binding by a small margin for the more risk averse player,
while it is binding by a large margin for the less risk averse player. The
optimal contract implies that the transfer fee for the less risk averse player is
higher and that this player demands d from club B at the renegotiation stage
because it is too costly to induce him to demand c. The more risk averse
player, instead, faces a less stringent incentive constraint corresponding to a
lower transfer fee. As a result, if the more risk averse player is transferred to
B, B’s total ﬁnancial outlay will be c.
It is clear that, in this example, A’s valuation of the player and the
distribution of B’s valuation of the player are not suﬃcient statistics for B’s
total payment. In particular, the transfer fee may have predictive power on
B’s total cost of hiring a player above and beyond vA and the distribution of
vB.13 Note that this prediction is in sharp contrast with what happens under
commitment, where, as stated in Proposition 2, vA and the distribution of
vB are suﬃcient statistics for B’s total ﬁnancial outlay in a transfer. This
diﬀerence constitutes the exclusion restriction that we test to identify whether
parties can commit not to renegotiate contracts. In the next subsection,
we show that this same test can also identify whether soccer contracts are
incomplete.
13In other contexts, there may be other reasons for the non-separability of rent extraction
and surplus division when parties cannot commit. For example, the transfer fee may
serve as a commitment device to deter coalitions between the player and club B at the
renegotiation stage. As we hope it is clear, our goal here is just to illustrate that there are
reasons for this non-separability rather than making an extensive list or claiming that the
speciﬁc mechanism modeled here is the empirically relevant.
23Before concluding the analysis of this example, we want to draw the
reader’s attention to two comparative statics exercises. First, the partial
eﬀect of the transfer fee on B’s total outlay in the event of a transaction may
be positive. This has been illustrated above. Second, this example points to
a link between the transfer fee and the probability of transferring a player.
This will be useful in the empirical section when we instrument the transfer
fee in our regressions.
Consider the optimal transfer fee for two diﬀerent players who are identi-
cal apart from the fact that one faces a distribution of vB, G, and the other
faces a distribution ¯ G that ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the former.
From the ﬁrst-order condition (2), we can see how a higher probability of a
transaction under ¯ G makes the division of surplus in the event of a trans-
action more important. As a result, the transfer fee under ¯ G will be closer
to the one that achieves the optimal division of surplus in the unconstrained
problem (F∗), and therefore higher than that corresponding to G.14 In sum,
by this argument, we expect to observe a positive relationship between trans-
fer fees and the probability of transferring a player.
3.2 Lack of commitment and contractual incomplete-
ness
Since we are ultimately interested in the implications of our test for the exis-
tence of incomplete contracts, we need to provide a link between commitment
and contractual incompleteness. For our purposes, Proposition 3 below will
suﬃce. This result is obtained under three assumptions.15 Its proof appears
14This mechanism constitutes just one possible theory of the transfer fee. In other
renegotiation settings, a high transfer fee can mitigate the lack of commitment and increase
the rent extracted by A and the player from B. However, a high transfer fee may also
have a negative eﬀect on the expected value of the player-A coalition. For example, since
the player’s capital gain in the event of transaction may be diminishing in the transfer
fee, the marginal product of the player’s eﬀort to become a better player may be reduced,
and this may deteriorate the player’s value for the current team. The optimal transfer fee
determined by A and the player at the initial contracting stage will trade oﬀ these two
forces. Whatever the cost of a higher transfer fee is, since the transfer fee increases the
total compensation to the contracting parties when the player is transferred to B,ah i g h e r
probability of transferring the player increases the importance of this eﬀect and thus the
marginal value of the transfer fee.
15All assumptions except A.2 are satisﬁed by Example 1. The condition in A.2 fails to
hold in Example 1 because VA is assumed to be a singleton. This discrepancy between A.2
24in the Appendix.
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Assumptions A.1 and A.2 rule out pathological distributions of vB. These
assumptions would be automatically satisﬁed, for example, if the distribution
of vB were suﬃciently close to a continuous distribution. The last assump-
tion, A.3, says that the player has a suﬃciently high bargaining power in the
negotiation with A,a f t e rB’s acceptance of the player’s oﬀer.
Proposition 3. Suppose that there is no commitment. Assume A.1, A.2,
and A.3. Let the player be risk-averse. Then every optimal contract is
incomplete.
and Example 1 could be resolved if VA were assumed to contain more than one element.
Moreover, one can show that, at the expense of making exposition more cumbersome, A.2
can be modiﬁed to encompass Example 1.
25This result says that lack of commitment constrains the set of imple-
mentable outcomes relative to what is achievable with commitment. In our
setting, the contracting parties would like to be able to enforce a clause
whereby they experience large punishments in case the renegotiation stage
is reached.
Given lack of commitment and the assumed renegotiation process, risk
aversion is necessary to generate a trade-oﬀ between rent extraction and
surplus division. If the player were risk-neutral, the interests of the player
and A as to the necessity of designing the contract in a way that maximizes
rent extraction would be aligned. In this case, optimal revenue extraction
could be achieved with and without commitment.16
4 Empirical analysis
In the previous section we have shown that, if agents can commit not to
renegotiate, the optimal contract is complete. In addition, when the player
changes club, the total expense incurred by B is fully determined by A’s
valuation of the player and the beliefs the player and A have about B’s
valuation of the player. We have also shown that, if agents cannot commit
not to renegotiate, any optimal contract A and the player may draw up is
incomplete. Moreover, the transfer fee agreed upon by the player and A may
have predictive power over B’s total ﬁnancial outlay from signing the player
after conditioning for vA and the distribution of vB.
These results provide us with an exclusion restriction that is useful to test
both the parties’ ability to commit not to renegotiate and the completeness
of contracts. Speciﬁcally, if there is commitment, we should observe that,
after controlling for the value of the player for the current team and that
16In passing, it is worth linking Proposition 3 with the immediately related branch
of the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracting. Segal [1999] and Hart
and Moore [1999] have provided a theory of incomplete contracting in which renegotiation
constrains the set of implementable outcomes and produces sub-optimal allocations. Their
setting features complete information. Maskin and Tirole [1999] and Maskin [2002] have
demonstrated that if parties are risk-averse and choice rules assign lotteries over outcomes
(rather than being deterministic) optimal contracts are immune to lack of commitment
in contractual environments with no third parties and (ex-post) complete information. In
our model, lack of commitment, along with incomplete information, risk-aversion, and the
presence of third parties leads to the implementation of sub-optimal allocations. We see
no reason why the use of lotteries should undermine the validity of Proposition 3.
26for the future team, no other variable should have any predictive power on
B’s disbursement. If, on the other hand, there is no commitment, other
variables, like the transfer fee, may have predictive power after controlling for
the player’s quality. Therefore, an observed excess sensitivity of the transfer
fee to the outsider’s expense would be evidence in favor of the no commitment
hypothesis and, by virtue of Proposition 3, of the presence of contractual
incompleteness in the data.
Before implementing the test, it is worthwhile noting that the excess sen-
sitivity of the transfer fee to the outsider’s payments is suﬃcient, but not
necessary, for lack of commitment. In this sense, our empirical strategy only
allows us to identify the incompleteness of contracts but not their complete-
ness.
4.1 Data
Our data set contains player-level data from the Spanish ﬁrst division soccer
league (“La Liga”) for the 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2001-2002 seasons.
Broadly speaking, there are four types of variables. First, we have a set of
demographic variables: age, position in the ﬁeld, and tenure in the team.
Second, we have data on the contracts for all the players that played in “La
Liga” during the 2000-2001 season and for those players that were transferred
to and/or from a “La Liga” club during the three seasons covered by this
study. Speciﬁcally, we know their wages (net of taxes) from their current
employer (for the players not transferred) or from their new employers (for
those who were transferred), their transfer fees, and their contract duration
(i.e., the duration of the relationship as originally speciﬁed in their contract).
Third, the data set also contains transfer prices for those players who changed
club while having a valid contract. Finally, the last set of variables contains
measures of the players’ quality and performance. We used the variables
computed by two specialized magazines: AS and Marca.
AS weights several objective measures of a player’s performance, like
number of games played, number of games won and tied, goals scored, a
measure of how important is a goal for the game’s result, number of assists,
number of important mistakes, etc. Marca uses the price paid to buy a player
to make an initial assessment of this player’s value for the club that has hired
him and then they upgrade the player’s value according to some objective
measure of the player’s performance.
These two approaches to the measurement of the players’ quality are con-
27ceptually very diﬀerent. The AS valuation of a player’s performance is com-
pletely independent of the player’s current value. Marca,i n s t e a d ,c o m p a r e s
a player’s performance with his current value to determine the appropriate
increment in value. Both strategies seem reasonable to us. On the other
hand, the weights given to the diﬀerent objective measures of performance
are not the same. This disparity is surely beneﬁcial to our analysis because
b yc o m b i n i n gt h et w om e a s u r e sw es h o u l db ea b l et oc a p t u r ed i ﬀerent aspects
o ft h ep l a y e r ’ sv a l u ef o rh i sc l u b .
4.2 Descriptive statistics
During the 2000-2001 season, out of the 550 players that played in the Spanish
championship (“La Liga”), 10 percent were goalkeepers, 33 percent defenders,
37 percent midﬁelders, and 20 percent strikers. As reported in Table 1A, the
age of the players ranged from 18 to 38 and average and median age was
about 26 years. About 30 percent of the players were new to their teams.
Out of these, approximately two out of three came from a diﬀerent club and
a third had been promoted from an aﬃliated minor league team. Therefore,
the turnover rate in the 2000-2001 season was about 20 percent and the
average tenure in the team was about 2.1 years.17 The average and median
contract expired in 2003, with a standard deviation on the expiration date
of 1.6 years.
The average wage, net of taxes, for the 2000-2001 season was about 200
million pesetas (i.e., about a million dollars at the time), with a standard
deviation of 132 million pesetas and a range from 27.5 to 1100. The median
wage was 175 million pesetas. Overall, the distribution of wages is approxi-
mately log-normal.
O v e r9 5p e r c e n to ft h ep l a y e r sh a dap o s i t i v et r a n s f e rf e ei nt h e2 0 0 0 -
2001 season. Transfer fees range from 0 to 50000 million pesetas. The average
transfer fee was 4082 million pesetas (over 20 million dollars), with a standard
deviation of about 5000 million pesetas and a median transfer fee of 2000
million pesetas.
Next, we turn to the transfer prices and their connection to the transfer
fees. The average transfer price is about 45 percent the average transfer fee.
Out of the 135 players who were hired by Spanish clubs during the 1999-2000,
2000-2001, and 2001-2002 seasons and whose contract speciﬁed a positive
17Conditional on having stayed one year on the team, the average tenure was 2.9.
28transfer fee, 90 percent were hired at a transfer price less than or equal to
the transfer fee. This is not surprising. Why would a club pay more than the
player’s transfer fee? There are only two reasons. When club B executes the
option of hiring a young player by paying club A the player’s transfer fee, B
must pay club A an additional compensation for having trained the player.
This can explain ten of the seventeen cases where the price-fee ratio is larger
than one. The other seven are probably due to misreporting of either the
transfer fee or the price.
Finally, the price paid by a buying club to a selling club is only part of
the total cost the buying club must incur when hiring a player, for the buying
club oﬀers a new contract to the player. In what follows, we deﬁne the total
compensation paid by a buying club as the sum of the price paid to the old
club for the player’s transfer plus thet o t a ln e tw a g et h ep l a y e ri sg o i n gt o
receive under the new deal. In our sample of transfers, the total compensation
ranges from 145 to 16000 million with an average of 1788 million pesetas, a
median of 1150, and a 25-75 percentile of 625-2400 million.
Next, we study the performance and quality measures constructed by AS
and Marca. Our data set contains the values of these measures at the end
of the 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2001-2002 seasons. In the 2001-
2002 season, Marca changed the procedure to compute the players’ valuation
and hence these numbers are not comparable to the previous seasons’ valu-
ations.18 T h ed e c l i n eo v e rt i m ei nt h ea v e r a g eAS valuation of the players
is probably due to attrition (i.e., only the good players stay in the sample,
while the new players’ quality is heterogenous).19 Nonetheless, we observe an
increase in the average Marca value from the 1998-1999 to the 1999-2000 sea-
sons and a subsequent stabilization of the measure. This increase in Marca’s
valuations is consistent with the increase in the business value of soccer over
the period covered by this paper.
As one would expect, the AS performance measure is highly correlated
to the value measure from Marca. The correlation coeﬃcients range from 50
to 91 percent and are always statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
The highest correlation corresponds to the 2001-2002 season, precisely when
Marca shifted from a value to a pure performance measure.
In Table 1B, we focus on the 2000-2001 season and explore the role of
18The new approach followed by Marca is closer to AS’s because it is also a measure of
performance rather than a measure of value.
19It could also be due to the migration of the best players to other European leagues,
but this has not been the case.
29several performance and demographic variables in the construction of the
Marca player valuation measure. In the ﬁrst column we can observe that
those players who had a good season according to AS had also higher Marca
values at the end of the season. Speciﬁcally, the elasticity of Marca’s valu-
ation with respect to AS’s performance measure is 39 percent. In line with
conventional wisdom, strikers are more valuable for Marca than players in
other ﬁeld positions. Marca’s valuation does not seem to be aﬀected by age.
H o w e v e r ,t h et e n u r ei nt h et e a mh a sap o s i t i v ee ﬀect on Marca’s valuation.
In columns 3 and 4, we include AS measures of the players’ performance in
previous seasons as regressors to identify whether this eﬀect is due to the
presence of team speciﬁc skills or to selection. The inclusion of these mea-
sures of past performance reduces the size of the eﬀect of tenure in the team
and makes it insigniﬁcant. Thus, we conclude that the eﬀe c to ft e n u r ei nt h e
Marca valuation may just reﬂect selection bias.
In the second column we include team dummies to inspect Marca’s phi-
losophy of applying diﬀe r e n ty a r d s t i c k st oe v a l u a t et h ep e r f o r m a n c eo fp l a y -
ers on diﬀerent teams. A given objective performance is associated with a
highest value if the player plays on Real Madrid or Barcelona (the two most
important teams in terms of supporters, historical achievements, and number
of supporters in “La Liga”), but teams like Valencia, Deportivo, Celta, and
Mallorca also have a premium according to Marca. This is quite reasonable
provided that these teams ended up in the top six positions at the end of the
season and therefore participated in the prestigious European competitions.20
In our test for the existence of commitment we will condition on the
player’s value at his current club. It is therefore important to have an ac-
curate measure of the player’s quality. Before presenting formal evidence
that supports this premise, it is worth noting that Marca’s valuations, for
example, are compared to the assessments of the players’ value at the end of
every season as estimated by the players’ agents. Further, Marca’s experts
have mentioned to us that the agents use Marca’s measure for their private
business.
One way of assessing the accuracy of Marca and AS measures is by corre-
lating them with the market’s valuation of the players’ performance. Later,
in Table 3, we will see that our proxies are important to understand transfer
20There are two European competitions: the Champions League and the (less important)
Uefa Cup. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient of the ﬁxed eﬀect is larger for the teams that
participated in the Champions League in the 2001-2002 season.
30payments by the buying clubs. In columns 5 and 6 of Table 1B, we study the
correlation between the Marca valuation and the AS performance measure
at the end of the 1999-2000 season with the wage rate received by players
during the 2000-2001 season. We ﬁnd that the elasticity of the wage rate
with respect to Marca’s valuation is 37 percent (27 once we include team
dummies) and is very signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Interestingly, the dif-
ferent measures of player’s quality and the demographic variables account
for 52 percent of the variation in wages. It is important to keep in mind
that, in many cases, the contracts that specify the players’ compensation
in the 2000-2001 season were determined prior to the 1999-2000 season and
that, in any case, we don’t want to infer any causal relationship from these
correlations.
Another way to evaluate the quality of our performance measures is by
comparing the AS measure with the actual performance at the team level.
We deﬁne the AS performance of a team as the sum of the AS performance
of the players in the team. Table 2 shows the performance of teams (mea-
sured using this transformation of the AS performance measure) and the
team classiﬁcation in “La Liga” at the end of the 2000-2001 season.21 The
correlation between the two is 91 percent.
4.3 Testing out contractual incompleteness
The key to identifying the relevant contractual setting is to determine the
predictive power of a player’s transfer fee on a club’s total disbursement from
signing a player after controlling for the value of the player for the current
team and the new team. However, our measures of the players’ values could
fail to capture some component of the players’ qualities. For our test to
be valid, it is crucial that the transfer fee be orthogonal to the unmeasured
components of the players’ values.
Table 3 reports the regressions that test the role of the transfer fee on
the total compensation. In the ﬁrst column, we just regress the log of total
compensation on the quality measures constructed by AS and Marca at the
end of the season and prior to the summer, which is when transfers takes
place. As one would expect, players with higher scores in AS and Marca are
more expensive.
Column 2 introduces the log of the player’s transfer fee for the old team
21More precisely, this exercise was conducted three matches before the season was over.
31as a regressor. The estimates indicate that, ceteris paribus, a higher transfer
fee increases the total payments incurred by the buying club to hire the
player. Speciﬁcally, the elasticity of the total compensation with respect to
the transfer fee is 43 percent and highly signiﬁcant.
At this stage, however, we must interpret this coeﬃcient with caution.
Before concluding that the transfer fee has predictive power over and above
the player’s valuations, we have to address two potential sources of bias.
First, the quality measures provided by AS and Marca may be imperfect
and the transfer fee may be correlated with some unmeasured component
of the player’s quality. In this case, even under commitment, we should
expect the transfer fee to have a positive eﬀect on the total compensation.
Second, under commitment and according to Proposition 2, it is the value
of the player for the current team and the distribution of beliefs about the
player’s value for the future team what constitutes a suﬃcient statistic for
the total compensation. If the transfer fee were correlated with the value of
the player for the new team after controlling for his current team’s valuation,
the estimated elasticity of the total compensation with respect to the transfer
fee would be biased.
Note, however, that there is no other relevant source of bias in our esti-
mates because, under the null that parties can commit not to renegotiate, no
other variable apart from the values of the player for his current and future
clubs should aﬀect the buying club’s total payment. In this sense, this test
is immune to the standard committed variable bias.
We address the potential biases from the mismeasurement of vA and the
distribution of vB in two ways. First, in regressions not reported here, we ﬁnd
that, in our sample of transferred players, the transfer fee does not have any
predictive power on the value of the player for the new team after controlling
for the current measures of his quality. Second, to discredit the eﬀect of
mismeasurement on the signiﬁcance of the transfer fee, we instrument for the
transfer fee in regression 2. To this end, we need variables that are correlated
with the player’s transfer fee but uncorrelated with the error term. To ﬁnd
such variables, we need a theory about the determinants of the transfer fee.
In the previous section, we have observed that the transfer fee aﬀects
both the division of the surplus in the event of a transaction and the player’s
incentives when making a proposal to B at the renegotiation stage. The
player does not internalize A’s loss in the event of no transaction and, as
a result, tends to be too aggressive when he makes a demand to B.T o
mitigate this distortion, the optimal transfer fee tends to be smaller than the
32fee that achieves an optimal division of surplus. This makes it more attractive
for the player to be transferred to club B and induces him to behave more
conservatively at the renegotiation stage. This trade-oﬀ between surplus
division and rent extraction is aﬀected by the probability distribution of vB,
which, ceteris paribus,a ﬀects the probability of observing a transaction. In
particular, an exogenous increase in the probability of a transaction renders
the problem of surplus division more relevant and leads to an increase in the
optimal transfer fee.
This insight allows us to construct two variables that we use to instru-
ment for a player’s transfer fee. These are the frequency of a transfer for the
players in the same position and team during the 2000-2001 season.22 From
the previous argument, these variables will be positively correlated with the
player’s transfer fee. Further, we believe that the probability of transfer-
ring a player by position or team is uncorrelated with the error term. The
argument has two parts. First, note that the probability of transferring a
player is probably unrelated to his value since both good and bad players are
transferred. This suspicion is corroborated by the estimation (not reported
here) of binary choice models where we have observed that the player’s value
as measured by AS and Marca has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the (binary) vari-
able that reﬂects whether the player has been transferred.23 Second, since
the probability of a transfer by position or team seems to be unrelated to
our measures of the players’ value, it seems very likely that they will also be
uncorrelated to the mistakes made by Marca and AS when measuring the
value. For this reason, we believe that the average transfer rates by position
and team are valid instruments for the player’s transfer fee.
A third instrument for the transfer fee of a player that we consider is the
average transfer fee in his club once he is excluded. This variable is a priori
correlated with the player’s transfer fee because diﬀerent clubs follow diﬀerent
personnel policies that have a common eﬀect on their players’ transfer fees.
For example, some clubs decide to sign very long-lasting contracts while
others do not mind having a high turnover. Some clubs tend to sign their
players with contracts with very high transfer fees to dissuade other clubs
22The fraction of players transferred for each of the positions where 17 percent for
goal-keepers, 14.6 percent for defenders, 17.5 percent for midﬁelders, and 18.5 percent for
strikers. For the teams, the fraction of players transferred during the 2000-2001 season
ranged from 0 for Real Madrid to 27 percent for Mallorca and 28 percent for Alavés.
23This is true also when the left-hand-side variable is the probability of transfer by
position or by team rather than a binary variable.
33to attempt to hire them because this may distract the players and aﬀect
their performance. Finally, clubs diﬀer in their governance structures and
this aﬀects the incentives of the managers and the contracts they oﬀer the
players at the contracting stage. All of these elements should have an eﬀect
on the transfer fee, and none of them seems to have a ﬁrst-order impact on
ap l a y e r ’ sv a l u a t i o n .
In addition, the average transfer fee for a team should be uncorrelated
with the error term if AS and Marca’s assessments of the players’ qualities
do not feature systematic mistakes within teams that are correlated with
the average transfer fee for the team. Given the accuracy of our quality
measures at the team level–illustrated, for example, by the high correlation
(91 percent) between a team’s AS score and the actual performance in the
league–we think that it is reasonable to believe that the error term and this
instrument are uncorrelated.
Interestingly, since we have more instruments than instrumented vari-
ables, we can examine the validity of our instruments more formally with an
overidentifying restrictions test.24 Of course, since we cannot test identifying
restrictions exactly, passing the overidentifying restriction test is a necessary
but not suﬃcient condition for the instruments’ validity. However, we have
only one endogenous variable and more than one instrument, and our instru-
ments are strongly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst-stage regression. Thus, we would
expect our test to have some power.25
Columns 3 to 9 report the results of the instrumented regressions using
the seven possible combinations of instruments. For each regression, Panel
A reports the two-stage least squares estimate of the elasticity of the total
compensation with respect to the transfer fee after controlling for the player’s
quality measures. Panel B reports the ﬁrst stage regression of the transfer
fee on the instruments. Finally, Panel C reports the p-value of the J statistic
that tests the null that the error term is uncorrelated with the instruments.
In columns 3 to 5 we use the three instruments separately to instrument
24One interpretation of this test is that it allows us to see whether the eﬀect of the
instruments on the total payments by the buying club operate exclusively through the
instrumented variable (i.e., the transfer fee) or through some other relevant variable that
has been omitted in the regression.
25Note that a rejection of the hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous might, in
principle, lead to a rejection of the null that there is commitment if the eﬀect of the instru-
ments on the total compensation operates through some variable other than unmeasured
quality. This hypothesis, however, is impossible to test.
34for the player’s transfer fee. In the ﬁrst stage regression we ﬁnd that, as one
would expect, higher Marca valuations and AS performance measures are
associated with higher transfer fees, though the latter is not always signiﬁ-
cant. More relevant for our purposes is the fact that the three instruments
have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the transfer fee, as our theory of the
optimal transfer would predict.26
In the second-stage regressions reported in Panel A, we observe that the
instrumented transfer fee has a large and signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the
total payments by the buying club.
At this stage the only concern one may have is whether the instruments
are truly valid. To check this, we combine them in columns 6 to 9. First,
we assess the strength of the instrumental variables. In column 6 we instru-
ment the player’s transfer fee with the average transfer fee for the team and
with the frequency of transfers for the team. In this case, the instruments
are jointly relevant. Speciﬁcally, the F-statistic that tests the null that the
instruments have no eﬀect on the transfer fee is 19, substantially higher than
the rule of thumb threshold of 10. However, the frequency of transfer by po-
sition is not marginally signiﬁcant at the conventional levels (p-value =0 .09).
This may invalidate the overidentifying restriction test.
In column 7, we instrument with the average transfer by team and with
the frequency of transfer by team. In this case, the instruments are clearly
relevant since the F-statistic is 23 and both instruments are marginally sig-
niﬁcant in the ﬁrst-stage regression. By combining the frequencies of transfer
by position and by team to instrument for the transfer fee we may run into
a weak instruments bias as indicated by the F-statistic in column 8, clearly
below the threshold of 10. In this case, both instruments are marginally
signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst-stage regression. Finally, in column 9, we combine the
three variables to instrument for the player’s transfer fee. Again, we ﬁnd
that the instruments are very relevant in predicting the transfer fee above
and beyond the player’s quality, with an F-statistic of almost 17. Further,
all the instruments are marginally signiﬁcant.
In the second-stage regressions reported in Panel A, we always ﬁnd that
the Marca and AS quality measures have a positive eﬀect on the total pay-
ments of the buying club, although the eﬀect of the former is not always sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. More interestingly, we also ﬁnd that the instrumented
26For the frequency of transfer by position, the eﬀect on the transfer fee reported in
column 4 has a p-value of 5.8 percent.
35transfer fee has always a strong positive eﬀect on the total compensation to
the player and A.T h i s e ﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant. More speciﬁcally,
the point estimate of the elasticity of the total payments with respect to the
instrumented transfer fee ranges from 48 to 62 percent.
To conclude our check of the validity of the instruments, we have to test
whether our instruments are exogenous. This can be done by taking advan-
tage of the overidentiﬁcation of the system. Mechanically, the overidentifying
restriction test amounts to checking whether the instruments have any pre-
dictive power on the error term above and beyond the quality controls.27
Panel C of Table 3 reports the p-value for the test of the null that the in-
struments have no predictive power on the error term above and beyond the
q u a l i t yc o n t r o l s .T h e r ew ec a ns e et h a to u ri n s t r u m e n t sp a s st h i st e s t .T h e
p-values of the statistics range from 19 to 29 percent, higher than conven-
tional signiﬁcance levels. This gives us some reassurance on the exogeneity
and validity of our instruments.
Hence, we can conclude that the transfer fee has an independent and
positive eﬀect on the total compensation above and beyond the player’s val-
uations. In light of Propositions 2 and 5 and Example 1, this implies that
parties cannot commit not to renegotiate their initial contracts. Further,
since the optimal contract under lack of commitment is incomplete, it also
implies that soccer player contracts are incomplete.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper has designed and implemented a test to determine whether con-
tracts are incomplete. To this end, we have studied the contractual rela-
tionship between a risk-averse player and a club who sign a contract that
involves a third party–a potential recruiter of the player–who is missing
at the contracting stage. In this environment, we have shown that the par-
ties’ lack of commitment not to renegotiate contractual ineﬃciencies restricts
the set of implementable outcomes–relative to what is achievable under
commitment–and leads to the signing of a contract which is incomplete in
t h a tt h ep a r t i e sw o u l dl i k et ob ea b l et oe n f o r c ec l a u s e st h a ta r ec o n t i n g e n t
on observable (but unveriﬁable) information.
The test is based on the observation that, under commitment, parties can
extract rents from the recruiter in an optimal fashion, and, at the same time,
27See for example Stock and Watson [2003].
36divide the surplus extracted to ﬁne-tune risk-sharing. We have shown that
this has the following implication for the determinants of the outsider’s total
ﬁnancial outlay from signing the player: whenever a transaction takes place,
the old team’s valuation of the player and the parties’ beliefs about the new
team’s valuation of the player are suﬃcient statistics for the outsider’s total
disbursement. In contrast, when parties lack the ability to commit not to
renegotiate contracts, the separation of surplus division and rent extraction
is not possible, and variables that aﬀect the division of surplus, such as the
transfer fee, may have forecasting power on the outsider’s total expenses after
controlling for the clubs’ valuations of the player.
The test has been implemented using a data set on Spanish soccer player
contracts constructed with the help of professionals from the two leading
soccer magazines in Spain. We have shown that the player valuations are not
suﬃcient statistics for the total payments of the buying club. In particular,
the transfer fee speciﬁed ex-ante in the initial contract has a large positive
eﬀect on the total cost of hiring a player for the buying club. This ﬁnding
provides evidence in favor of the no commitment hypothesis and, since an
optimal contract under no commitment is incomplete, points to the presence
of contractual incompleteness in the data.
The immediate question that comes to mind is whether our result is likely
to hold in other environments. We believe that, indeed, this result should
hold af o r t i o r iin many other economic environments. As we have seen,
soccer players tend to have a much higher turnover rate than most workers.
As a result, players are transferred repeatedly through the 10-15 years that
spans the professional career of a player. Clubs last much longer than that.
Further, anything that surrounds soccer is highly visible for the millions of
fans who passionately support a team. Hence, any deviation by a player is
going to be detected by the team’s supporters, who retaliate in various ways
at a very large cost for the deviators.28 T h es a m ea r g u m e n t sa p p l y ,af o r t i o r i ,
to the deviations incurred by clubs, given their longer life span. The degree of
repetition, observability, and punishment make soccer an environment where
we should a priori expect folk theorems an reputational considerations to
apply. Yet, even in this “ideal” scenario, we have found evidence in favor of
lack of commitment and contractual incompleteness.
28Examples of this are almost countless. Two very clear cases are those of Figo and
Mendieta.
37Appendix
AP r o o f s
Lemma 1. Suppose that f is feasible with commitment. Then, for every
vA ∈ VA, there exists T(vA) ∈ R such that, if vB >T(vA), the player signs
for B under f(vA,v B) and the monetary transfers received by the player and
A a d du pt oT(vA),a n d ,i fvB <T(vA), there is no transaction with B under
f(vA,v B).










≥ 0 for every v ∈ V (3)







f(vA, ˜ vB),(vA,v B)
´
for each ˜ vB ∈ VB and every (vA,v B) ∈ V.
(4)
Fix vA, vB,a n d˜ vB such that f(vA,v B) and f(vA,˜ vB) allocate the player to

















f(vA,v B),(vA, ˜ vB)
´
,
which follow from (4), imply xP + xA =˜ xP +˜ xA.
Therefore, for each vA,w em a yd e ﬁne T(vA) as the sum of the monetary
transfers received by the player and A under any outcome f(vA,v B) that





= vB − T(vA).
But since B can guarantee himself a payoﬀ of 0 (see (3)), the desired result
follows. k










Let f∗ be deﬁned as follows. In state (vA,v B) ∈ V , the player stays on A if
vB <B (vA) and signs for B otherwise. The distribution of transfers imple-
mented by f∗ is (w,−w,0),f o rs o m ew ∈ R, if the player stays on A and
(w,B(vA)−w,−B(vA)) otherwise. It is easily seen that if u(w) ≥ 0 and F is
suﬃciently high then the renegotiation mechanism described in Subsection
3.1.2 (which may be reformulat e da c c o r d i n gt oo u rf o r m a ld e ﬁnition) imple-
ments f∗ and f∗ maximizes the sum of the parties’ date-0 expected payoﬀs.
k
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that there is commitment. Suppose that
A and the player sign an optimal contract f.D e ﬁne xP(y) as the monetary
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39Since there exists a contract f◦ that is feasible with commitment and satisﬁes
xP(f


























the desired conclusion follows. k
Lemma 2. Let the renegotiation game described in Section 3.1.2 be formally
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implements f and an equilibrium (˜ s,µ) of a corresponding game Γ(g,F).
For v ∈ V ,s e t







Suppose that y(vA,vB) and y(vA,˜ vB) allocate the player to B with corresponding
distributions of payments (xi) and (˜ xi), respectively. Then xP+xA =˜ xP+˜ xA.
Proof. Because (˜ s,µ) is an equilibrium of Γ(g,F),




















which can be rewritten as
vB + xB ≥ vB +˜ xB,
˜ vB +˜ xB ≥ ˜ vB + xB.
40This implies xB =˜ xB, whence xP + xA =˜ xP +˜ xA, as desired. k
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Suppose that there is no commitment. Assume A.1,
A.2,a n dA.3. Let the player be risk-averse. Let f be an optimal contract.




that implements f and an equilibrium (˜ s,µ)
of a corresponding game Γ(g,F).F o rv ∈ V ,s e t







For i ∈ {P,A,B},d e ﬁne xi(y) as the monetary transfer received by agent i
under outcome y.
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It is easily seen that f∗ is feasible with commitment. In view of (5), therefore,
















Lemma 2 implies that, for every vA ∈ VA,w em a yd e ﬁne T(vA) as the sum
of the monetary payments received by the player and A under any outcome






= vB − T(vA).
But since B can guarantee himself a payoﬀ of 0, then, for every vA ∈ VA,t h e
player signs for B under f(vA,v B) if vB >T(vA) and there is no transaction
with B under f(vA,v B) if vB <T (vA). It can be shown that because f is
41optimal f(vA,v B) allocates the player to B whenever vB = T(vA).29 We now
consider two cases.
First, suppose that xP(yv) 6= xP(y˜ v) for some pair v,˜ v ∈ V with α(v),α(˜ v) >






















































We now turn to the case where
xP(yv)=xP(y˜ v)=xP for every v,˜ v ∈ V with α(v),α(˜ v) > 0.( 7 )
















for some vA ∈ VA with αA(vA) > 0.
(9)
Inequality (8) is shown to hold by noticing that (5) gives xP = xP(yv) for
every v ∈ V .
29Otherwise, another feasible contract ˜ f could be obtained which would be exactly as f
except that ˜ f(vA,v B) would allocate the player to B whenever vB = T(vA). This contract
would improve the date-0 expected payoﬀ of either the player or A without hurting the
date-0 expected payoﬀ of any of these two parties.
















for every vA ∈ VA with αA(vA) > 0 and we obtain a contradiction. Observe
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A) >v B.M o r e o v e r ,αB(vB) > 0 by assumption. It follows
that there exists v∗
B ∈ VB with v∗
B <T (v∗
A) and αB(v∗





allocates the player to A,w h e r ev∗ =( v∗
A,v∗
B) (otherwise, some
type of B would be losing money). But then renegotiation is reached in state






















We must have xv∗ ≥ T(v∗
A), for otherwise those types of B with valuations
above T(v∗
A) would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to mimic the strategy of type v∗
B,f o r c e
renegotiation, and accept to pay xv∗ rather than T(v∗
A). But then there must
exist some v◦ =( v∗
A,v ◦
B) ∈ V with v◦
B ≥ T(v∗
A) and αB(v◦





allocates the player to A,f o ro t h e r w i s exv∗ could not be a maximizer
of the above program.
By the deﬁnition of T(v∗
A) and the inequality v◦
B ≥ T(v∗
A),t h ep l a y e r ’ s
demand at the renegotiation stage in state v◦ must be T(v∗
A).


















Indeed, Proposition 2 entails that the second term of this equation is the
maximum ex-ante expected revenue extracted from B under any contract
43that is feasible with commitment, and therefore it is also the maximum ex-
ante expected revenue extracted from B under any contract that is feasible
with no commitment. The ﬁr s tp a r to fe q u a t i o n( 1 1 )h o l d sb e c a u s eA must
obtain at least an ex-ante expected payoﬀ of 0 under f. The second part of




























the assumption in (7) is contradicted.
We conclude that, under the assumption in (7), (8) and (9) must hold
















































which establishes (6), as desired. k
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47Table 1A Descriptive Statistics 
 
              
   Goal Keeper  Defender Midfielder Striker  N          
Positions  55 180  203  112  550         
                
   Mean  St.devt.  Median  Min  Max  N      
Age  26.37 3.73  26  18 39 494       
                
   Mean  St.devt.  25%  50%  75%  Min  Max  N 
Tranf.Fee  4082 5086  1000  2000  5000 0  50000  430 
Transf. Price   822 1146  200  400  1000  10  10000  253   
Total Comp.  1788  1928  625  1150 2400  145 16000 189 
             
   Mean  St.devt.  25%  50%  75%  Min  Max  N 
Wage  200 132.53  125 175  250  27.5  1100  435 
                
Marca Mean  St.devt.  Median  Min  Max  N      
1999  582 689  400  50  4000  225      
2000  952 932  650  50  7500  321      
2001  907 1308  575 90  13450  517      
2002  42.06 28.1  41  -1 114  335     
             
AS Mean  St.devt.  Median  Min  Max  N      
1999  164 102  174 1  492  262      
2000  153.67 86  157  1 387  323       
2001  134  88  128  1  399  485       
2002  155.7 941.2 156  3  396 337     
 
Descriptive statistics for players in “La Liga” for the 2000-2001 season. Wages and Marca valuations up to 
2001 are measured in million pesetas. Marca valuations for 2002 are measured in Marca points. AS 
valuations are measured in AS points. Valuations for year X are measured at the beginning of the summer 
transfer period for the season X-X+1.    Table 1B- Relation between Valuation and Performance Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
   Dependent var. is the log of Marca in 2001 Dependent var. is log net wage
Performance
log(AS 2001) 0.39 0.32 0.31 0.32
(0.3) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
log(AS 2000) 0.31 0.32 0.01 0.05




log(Marca 2000) 0.37 0.27
(0.03) (0.04)
Position
Goal Keeper -0.32 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.34 -0.38
(0.15) (0.11) (0.16) (0.2) (0.1) (0.06)
Defender -0.39 -0.46 -0.44 -0.5 -0.27 -0.3
(0.1) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06)
Midfielder -0.25 -0.1 -0.26 -0.29 -0.1 -0.12
(0.1) (0.23) (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06)
Demographics
log(Age) -0.28 -0.1 -0.56 -0.69 0.28 0.47
(0.28) (0.23) (0.3) (0.35) (0.18) (0.17)
log(Tenure in Team) 0.11 0.1 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.6) (0.03) (0.03)
Ad. R2 0.32 0.6 0.39 0.46 0.52 0.62
N 302 302 251 188 228 228
Team Dummies No Yes No No No Yes
t-stats in parenthesis. The valuations computed by the Marca magazine and wages are measured in million of pesetas. 
The performace measures computed by AS (AS) are expressed in AS points. Goal Keeper, Defender and Midfielder 
correspond to position dummies.Table 2: Rankings by Team in League and in AS, 2000-2001 season
Team Ranking League Ranking AS Total Points AS
Real Madrid 1 1 3949
Deportivo 2 2 3784
Valencia 3 4 3616
Mallorca 4 5 3469
Barcelona 5 3 3682
Celta 6 8 3310
Villareal 7 7 3350
Malaga 8 6 3392
Alaves 9 9 3309
Espanyol 10 10 3255
Athletic 11 13 3110
Las Palmas 12 19 2936
Zaragoza 13 11 3216
Rayo 14 12 3167
Real Sociedad 15 20 2808
Valladolid 16 14 3061
Oviedo 17 15 3038
Osasuna 18 17 2941
Racing 19 18 2936
Numancia 20 16 2979   
The Rankings are computed 3 matches before the end of the 2000-2001 season
Ranking League is given by the classification in the League. Ranking AS is 
the ranking according to the total points assigned by AS to the teamTable 3-Testing for Contractual Incompleteness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A Dependent variable is the log of the total payments by buying club when a player is transferred
OLS Two-Stage Least Squares
log(Marca) 0.28 0.13 0.09 0.1 -0.02 0.08 0.1 0.11 0.09
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
log(AS) 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.34 0.41 0.425 0.39 0.42
(0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
log(Transfer Fee) 0.46 0.55 0.71 1.37 0.6 0.48 0.62 0.53
(0.07) (0.16) (0.18) (0.45) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Ad. R2 0.42 0.68 0.56 0.49 0.46 0.58 0.56 0.51 0.58
Panel B First Stage for the log of the transfer fee
log(Marca) 0.15 0.2 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.11
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
log(AS) 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.05 0.15
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
log(avg. team transfer fee) 0.48 0.46 0.54 0.52
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Prob. Of transfer in position 11 8.8 12.44 9.35
(5.7) (5.16) (5.62) (4.9)
Prob of transfer in team 1.56 2.08 1.73 7.12
(0.74) (0.71) (0.73) (0.7)
Ad. R2 0.32 0.13 0.14 0.33 0.37 0.17 0.39
F 34.56 3.68 4.5 19.15 23.1 4.8 16.88
N 107 91 90 96 96 90 90 96 90
Panel C Overidentifying restriction test
p-value of Chi-squared - - - - - 0.185 0.29 0.25 0.195
Standard errors in parenthesis. Marca and AS are the measures of the player's value and performance at his current team as measured by the specialized 
magazines Marca and AS. The average transfer fee in the team variable excludes the player.